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THE SHAPE OF INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES1
By Robert Nau
Duke University
Incomplete preferences provide the epistemic foundation for mod-
els of imprecise subjective probabilities and utilities that are used in
robust Bayesian analysis and in theories of bounded rationality. This
paper presents a simple axiomatization of incomplete preferences and
characterizes the shape of their representing sets of probabilities and
utilities. Deletion of the completeness assumption from the axiom
system of Anscombe and Aumann yields preferences represented by
a convex set of state-dependent expected utilities, of which at least
one must be a probability/utility pair. A strengthening of the state-
independence axiom is needed to obtain a representation purely in
terms of a set of probability/utility pairs.
1. Introduction. In the Bayesian theory of choice under uncertainty, a
decision maker holds rational preferences among acts that are mappings
from states of nature {s} to consequences {c}. It is typically assumed that
rational preferences are complete, meaning that, for any two acts X and Y,
either X %Y (X is weakly preferred to Y) or else Y %X, or both. This
assumption, together with other rationality axioms such as transitivity and
independence, leads to a representation of preferences by a unique subjective
probability distribution on states p(s) and a unique utility function u(c)
on consequences, such that X %Y if and only if the subjective expected
utility of X is greater than or equal to that of Y [1, 5, 24]. However, the
completeness assumption may be inappropriate if only partial information
about the decision maker’s preferences is available, or if realistic limits on her
powers of discrimination are assumed, or if there are many decision makers
whose preferences may disagree.
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Incomplete preferences are generally represented by imprecise (set-valued)
probabilities and/or utilities. Varying degrees and types of imprecision have
been modeled previously in the literature of statistical decision theory and
rational choice:
1. If probabilities alone are considered to be imprecise, then preferences
can be represented by a set of probability distributions {p(s)} and to-
gether with a unique, exogenously-specified utility function u(c). The set
of probability distributions is typically convex, so the representation can
be derived by separating hyperplane arguments (e.g., [7, 15, 29, 31, 33]).
Representations of this kind are widely used in robust Bayesian statistics
[22, 32] and they are also attracting interest in economics [19].
2. If utilities alone are considered to be imprecise, preferences can be rep-
resented by a set of utility functions {u(c)} and a unique, exogenously-
specified probability distribution p(s), a representation that has been
axiomatized and applied to economic models by Aumann [2] and Dubra,
Maccheroni and Ok [4]. The set of utility functions in this case is also
typically convex, so that separating hyperplane arguments are again ap-
plicable: the roles of probabilities and utilities are merely reversed.
3. If both probabilities and utilities are allowed to be imprecise, they can be
represented by separate sets of probability distributions {p(s)} and utility
functions {u(c)} whose elements are paired up arbitrarily. This represen-
tation of preferences preserves the traditional separation of information
about beliefs from information about values when both are imprecise
[20, 21]. It lacks a compelling axiomatic basis, but it arises naturally
when imprecise probabilities and utilities are assessed independently, as
they often are in practice.
4. More generally, incomplete preferences can be represented by sets of
probability distributions paired with state-independent utility functions
{(p(s), u(c))}, a.k.a. “probability/utility pairs.” This representation has
an appealing multi-Bayesian interpretation and provides a normative ba-
sis for techniques of robust decision analysis [14] and asset pricing in
incomplete financial markets [30]. It has been axiomatized by Seidenfeld,
Schervish and Kadane [28] (henceforth SSK), starting from the “horse lot-
tery” formalization of decision theory introduced by Anscombe and Au-
mann [1]. However, as pointed out by SSK, the set of probability/utility
pairs is typically nonconvex and may even be unconnected, so that sep-
arating hyperplane arguments are hard to apply. Instead, SSK introduce
methods of transfinite induction and indirect reasoning.
The objective of this paper is to derive a simple representation of in-
complete preferences for the elementary case of finite state and reward
spaces, and to characterize the shape of the resulting sets of probabilities
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and utilities. First, it is shown that deleting both completeness and state-
independence from the horse-lottery axiom system of Anscombe and Au-
mann leads to a representation of preferences by a set of probabilities paired
with state-dependent utility functions {(p(s), u(s, c))}. Such pairs will be
called state-dependent expected utility (s.d.e.u.) functions. State-dependent
utilities have been used in economic models by Karni [9] and Dre`ze [3] and
are also discussed by Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane [25]. A set of s.d.e.u.
functions is typically convex—unlike a set of probability/utility pairs—so
that separating-hyperplane methods are still applicable at this stage. Next,
the usual state-independence axiom is reintroduced and shown to impose
(only) the further requirement that the representing set should contain at
least one probability/utility pair, analogous to SSK’s result establishing
one-way agreement between a partially ordered preference relation and a
nonempty set of probability/utility pairs. However, those assumptions are
too weak to yield two-way agreement in which every extremal preference has
an agreeing state-independent utility, because the state-independence axiom
may have limited applicability when preferences are incomplete. The main
result of this paper is to show that two-way agreement between incomplete
preferences and state-independent utilities can be achieved by strengthen-
ing the state-independence axiom. Although the representing set of probabil-
ity/utility pairs is nonconvex, it is characterized simply as the intersection of
a convex set of s.d.e.u. functions and the nonconvex set of state-independent
utilities.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces ba-
sic notation and derives a representation of preferences by convex sets of
s.d.e.u. functions when neither completeness nor state-independence is as-
sumed. Section 3 incorporates Anscombe and Aumann’s state-independence
assumption and shows that it requires (only) the existence of at least one
agreeing state-independent utility. Section 4 discusses an example of SSK to
highlight the implications of different continuity and strictness conditions.
Section 5 presents the stronger constructive axiom that is needed to obtain
a representation purely in terms of probability/utility pairs, illustrated by
another example. Section 6 briefly discusses the results. Proofs are given in
the Appendix.
2. Representation of incomplete preferences. Let S denote a finite set of
states and let C denote a finite set of consequences. Let B = {B :S×C 7→ ℜ}.
An element X ∈ B is a (horse) lottery if X ≥ 0 and ∀ s,
∑
cX(s, c) = 1,
with the interpretation that X(s, c) is the objective probability of receiving
consequence c when state s occurs. Henceforth, the symbols X, Y, Z and H
will be used to denote lotteries; the symbol B will denote an element of B
that is not necessarily a lottery (e.g., B will typically represent the difference
between two lotteries). A lottery X is constant if the probabilities it assigns
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to consequences are constant across states—that is, if X(s, c) =X(s′, c) for
all s, s′, c. The symbol % will denote weak preference between lotteries: X%
Y means that X is preferred or indifferent to Y, which is the behavioral
primitive. The domain of % is the set of all lotteries. The asymmetric part
of % is denoted by ≻, but it will not be used except in stating axiom A5.
An extension of % is any preference relation %0 that is stronger in the sense
that X%Y implies X%0 Y but not necessarily vice versa.
An event is a subset of S. The symbols E and F will be used interchange-
ably as names for events and for their indicator functions on S ×C, so that
for all c, E(s, c) = 1[0] if the event E includes [does not include] state s. Es
will denote the indicator vector for state s, so that for all c, Es(s
′, c) = 1[0]
if s = s′[s 6= s′]. If α is a scalar between 0 and 1, then αX + (1 − α)Y is
an objective mixture of X and Y: it yields consequence c in state s with
probability αX(s, c) + (1−α)Y (s, c). If E is an event, then EX+ (1−E)Y
is a subjective mixture of X and Y: it yields consequence c in state s with
probability X(s, c) if E(s, c) = 1, and with probability Y (s, c) otherwise.
Assume that C contains a “worst” and a “best” consequence, labeled
0 and 1, respectively. This assumption follows Luce and Raiffa [13] and
Anscombe and Aumann [1], and it is technically without loss of generality
in the sense that the preference order can always be extended to a larger
domain that includes two additional consequences which, by construction,
are better and worse, respectively, than all the original consequences. (Such
an extension is demonstrated by SSK, Theorem 2.) The best and worst con-
sequences ultimately serve to calibrate the definition and measurement of
subjective probabilities, but even so the probabilities remain somewhat ar-
bitrary, as will be shown. Intermediate consequences are labeled 2,3, . . . ,K,
and for all c ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,K}, Hc denotes the special lottery that yields con-
sequence c with probability 1 in every state. That is, for all s, Hc(s, c
′) = 1[0]
if c′ = c[c′ 6= c].
The first group of axioms that are assumed to govern rational preference
is as follows:
A1 (Quasi order) % is transitive and reflexive.
A2 (Mixture-independence) X%Y⇔ αX+(1−α)Z% αY+(1−α)Z ∀α∈
(0,1).
A3 (Continuity in probability) If {Xn} and {Yn} are convergent sequences
such that Xn %Yn, then limXn % limYn.
A4 (Existence of best and worst) For all c > 1, H1 %Hc %H0.
A5 (Coherence or nontriviality) H1 ≻H0 (i.e., not H0 %H1).
A1 and A2 are von Neumann and Morgenstern’s first two axioms of expected
utility, minus completeness, as applied to horse lotteries by Anscombe and
Aumann [1]; see also [5]. A3 is a strong continuity condition used by Garcia
del Amo and Rı´os Insua [6] that also works in infinite-dimensional spaces.
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A4 and A5 ensure nontriviality and provide reference points for probability
measurement, as noted earlier.
The following definition (following SSK) will prove useful for distinguish-
ing a subset of preferences that implicitly determines the entire preference
order:
Definition. A collection of preferences {Xn %Yn} is a basis for %
under an axiom system if every preference X % Y can be deduced from
{Xn %Yn} by direct application of those axioms.
The primal geometric representation of % is now given by the following:
Theorem 1. % satisfies A1–A5 if and only if there exists a closed con-
vex cone B∗ ⊂B, receding from the origin, such that X%Y⇔X−Y ∈ B∗.
In particular, if {Xn %Yn} is a basis for % under A1–A5, then B
∗ is the
closed convex hull of the rays whose directions are {Xn −Yn} for all n,
together with {H1 −Hc} and {Hc −H0} for all c.
Thus, the direction of preference between two lotteries X and Y depends
only on their difference X−Y, with X %Y if and only if X−Y is in a
convex cone B∗ of preferred directions. It follows that if EX+ (1−E)Z%
EY + (1−E)Z, where E is an event, then EX+ (1 −E)Z′ % EY + (1−
E)Z′ for any Z′,which is the so-called “sure-thing principle”: where two
lotteries agree, it does not matter how they agree there. Henceforth, be-
cause agreeing conditional components of lotteries do not affect preferences,
the expression EX % EY will be used as shorthand for EX+ (1−E)Z%
EY + (1 − E)Z for all Z, which means that X is preferred to Y condi-
tional on the event E, or, equivalently, that E(X−Y) is a preferred di-
rection. Similarly, for conditional lotteries embedded in objective mixtures,
αEX+(1−α)X′ % αEY+(1−α)Y ′ will be used (in Section 5) as shorthand
for α(EX+ (1−E)Z) + (1−α)X′ % α(EY+ (1−E)Z) + (1− α)Y′ for all
Z, meaning that αE(X−Y) + (1−α)(X′ −Y′) is a preferred direction.
To set the stage for the representation of incomplete preferences by sets
of state-dependent utilities, let a state-dependent expected utility (s.d.e.u.)
function be defined as a function v :S×C 7→ ℜ, with the interpretation that
v(s, c) is an expected utility associated with consequence c when it is to be
received in state s, and let Uv :B 7→ ℜ denote the utility function on lotteries
that is induced by v according to the linear formula
Uv(X)≡
∑
s∈S,c∈C
X(s, c)v(s, c).
In particular, Uv(EsHc + (1−Es)H0) = v(s, c).
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Definitions. (i) An s.d.e.u. function v is a probability/utility pair if it
can be expressed as the product of a probability distribution p: S 7→ [0,1]
and a state-independent utility function u: C 7→ ℜ, so that v(s, c) = p(s)u(c)
for all s and c. (ii) An s.d.e.u. function v agrees (one way) with % if X%
Y⇒ Uv(X)≥ Uv(Y). (iii) A set V of s.d.e.u. functions represents % if X%
Y⇔ Uv(X)−Uv(Y)≥ 0 ∀ v ∈ V .
A v that agrees with % is unique only up to positive linear scaling and the
addition of state-dependent constants and, by A4, it must satisfy Uv(H0)≤
Uv(Hc) ≤ Uv(H1); hence, there is no loss of generality in assuming that it
belongs to the normalized set
V+ ≡
{
v : v(s,0) = 0 ∀ s; 0≤
∑
s∈S
v(s, c)≤ 1∀ c≥ 2;
∑
s∈S
v(s,1) = 1
}
.
In these terms, the dual to Theorem 1 can now be given as follows:
Theorem 2. % satisfies A1–A5 if and only if it is represented by a
nonempty closed convex set of s.d.e.u. functions V∗ ∈ V+. In particular,
if {Xn % Yn} is a basis for %, then V
∗ is the set of v ∈ V+ satisfying
{Uv(Xn)≥ Uv(Yn)}.
The proof relies on a separating hyperplane argument. (For a similar
result on a more general space, see [21].) If the basis is finite, then V∗ is
a convex polytope whose elements need not be probability/utility pairs.
Subsequent sections of the paper will discuss the additional assumptions
needed to ensure that some points of V∗—especially its extreme points—are
probability/utility pairs.
3. The state-independence axiom. An additional axiom of Anscombe
and Aumann, which they call “monotonicity in the prizes” or “substitutabil-
ity,” provides the usual separation of subjective probability from utility, and
its implications in the context of incompleteness will now be explored. (Es-
sentially the same axiom appears as P3 in Savage’s system [24].) Some ad-
ditional notation will be helpful. First, for all p ∈ (0,1), let Hp denote the
lottery that yields the best and worst consequences with probabilities p and
1− p in every state, which is the objective mixture
Hp ≡ pH1 + (1− p)H0.
Next define HE as the lottery that yields the best consequence if event E
occurs and the worst consequence otherwise, that is, the subjective mixture
HE ≡EH1 + (1−E)H0.
A not-potentially-null event can then be defined by a comparison of subjec-
tive and objective mixtures:
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Definition. An event E is not potentially null if HE %Hp for some
p > 0.
The additional axiom asserts that conditional preferences among constant
lotteries may be propagated from not-potentially-null events to all other
conditioning events:
A6 (State-independence) If X and Y are constant and E is not poten-
tially null, then EX%EY⇒FX%FY for every other event F.
This assumption of state-independent preferences among constant lot-
teries makes possible the assignment of state-independent utilities to the
underlying consequences, which is central to the program of defining subjec-
tive probabilities in terms of preferences. A6 together with A4 ensures that
consequences 0 and 1 are worst and best in every state, that is, EsH0 -
EsHc -EsH1 for all s and c, which implies Uv(EsH0)≤Uv(EsHc)≤ Uv(EsH1)
for every agreeing v, which is equivalent to v(s,0) ≤ v(s, c) ≤ v(s,1). The
s.d.e.u. functions representing a relation that satisfies A6 can therefore be
normalized to lie within the set
V++ ≡
{
v : 0 = v(s,0)≤ v(s, c)≤ v(s,1)≤ 1
∀ s ∈ S, c≥ 2;
∑
s∈S
v(s,1) = 1
}
.
Under this normalization, it is “as if” consequences 0 and 1 have state-
independent utilities of 0 and 1, respectively, and the probability assigned to
state s by v can be interpreted as
pv(s)≡ pv(Es) = v(s,1),
because this is the expected utility of a lottery that yields a utility of 1 if
state s obtains and a utility of 0 otherwise. Correspondingly, the probability
assigned to any event E by v is defined by the summation
pv(E)≡ Uv(HE) =
∑
s∈E
pv(s).
(The same approach is used by Karni [10].) Under this interpretation, bounds
on subjective probabilities can be expressed by the decision maker in either
primal or dual terms in light of Theorems 1–2. The assertion that “the
probability of E is at least p,” that is, that p is a lower probability for E,
is defined primally by the preference HE %Hp and dually by the constraint
that pv(E) ≥ p for any v agreeing with %. Upper probabilities are defined
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analogously. An event is not potentially null if it has a strictly positive lower
probability.
Unfortunately, the attribution of state-independent utilities to consequences
is ultimately arbitrary and untestable: the decision maker’s true utilities
could have state-dependent origin and scale factors, even if the state-inde-
pendence axiom is satisfied, in which case the conventionally-defined subjec-
tive probabilities would not represent true degrees of belief. (State-dependent
utility scale factors would have exactly the same effects as beliefs.) The clas-
sic behavioral definitions of subjective probability given by Savage, Anscombe–
Aumann and others all suffer from the same arbitrariness. The intrinsic im-
possibility of inferring true probabilities from material preferences is dis-
cussed in more depth by Karni, Schmeidler and Vind [12], Rubin [23],
Kadane and Winkler [8], Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane [25], Karni and
Mongin [11] and Nau [16, 17].
Notwithstanding those caveats, the s.d.e.u. function v can be further de-
composed by dividing the expected utility of consequence c in state s by the
probability of the state to obtain
uv(s, c)≡ v(s, c)/pv(s) if pv(s)> 0
as the utility assigned to consequence c in state s. This utility is state-
independent if v is a probability/utility pair, and otherwise it is state-
dependent. In these terms, the expected utility assigned to any lottery X
by v can be rewritten as the expected value of a possibly-state-dependent
utility:
Uv(X) =
∑
s
pv(s)
∑
c
uv(s, c)X(s, c).
If v is a probability/utility pair, then v(s, c) = pv(Es)Uv(Hc) for all s and c.
Bounds on expected utilities can also be expressed in both primal and dual
terms. The assertion that “the expected utility of X is at least u” is de-
fined primally by the preference X%Hu and dually by the constraint that
Uv(X) ≥ u for any v agreeing with % . Similarly, for conditional expected
utility, define
Uv(X|E)≡Uv(XE)/pv(E),
provided pv(E) > 0. Then the assertion “the conditional expected utility
of X given E is at least u” has the primal definition EX % EHu and the
dual definition that Uv(X|E)≥ u for any v agreeing with % and satisfying
pv(E)> 0, because, for any agreeing v
EX%EHu =⇒ Uv(EX)≥ Uv(EHu) = upv(E)
⇐⇒ Uv(X|E)≥ u or else pv(E) = 0.
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If preferences are complete, in addition to A1–A5, then the primal repre-
sentation B∗ expands to an entire half-space of preferred directions and the
dual representation V∗ shrinks to a unique s.d.e.u. function v∗. When A6 is
also assumed, the unique v∗ must be a probability/utility pair, which is the
result obtained by Anscombe and Aumann [1]. In the absence of complete-
ness, the contribution of A6 to the separation of probability and utility is
weaker, as summarized by the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 3. % satisfies A1–A6 only if it is represented by a nonempty
closed convex set of s.d.e.u. functions V∗∗ ∈ V++ on which the maximum
and minimum expected utilities of every constant lottery are achieved at
probability/utility pairs. In particular, if {Xn %Yn} is a basis for % under
axioms A1–A6, then V∗∗ contains every probability/utility pair v ∈ V++ that
satisfies {Uv(Xn)≥Uv(Yn)}, of which there must be at least one.
Apart from the fact that V∗∗ contains all the probability/utility pairs
in V++ that agree with the basis preferences, its “shape” is not easy to
describe, as will be illustrated in Section 5.
An immediate implication of Theorem 3 is the property of stochastic dom-
inance, namely, that if X is obtained from Y by shifting probability mass
to consequence 1 from any other consequence, and/or from consequence 0
to any other consequence, in any state, then X %Y because in this case
Uv(X) ≥ Uv(Y) for all v ∈ V
++. To make this result more precise, let the
[·]min (minimum s.d.e.u.) operation be defined on B as
[B]min ≡ min
v∈V++
Uv(B) =min
s∈S
[
B(s,1) +
∑
c≥2
min{0,B(s, c)}
]
.
This quantity is the minimum possible state-dependent expected utility that
could be assigned to B: it is achieved by assigning, within each state, a utility
of 0 to those consequences c≥ 2 for which B is positive and a utility of 1 to
those consequences c≥ 2 for which B is negative, then assigning a subjective
probability of 1 to the state in which the conditional expected utility of B
is minimized. Stochastic dominance and the negative orthant in B can now
be defined in a natural way:
Definitions. (i) X ≥∗ [>∗]Y (“X [strictly ] dominates Y”) if [X −
Y]min ≥ [>]0. (ii) The open negative orthant B
− consists of those B that
are strictly dominated by the zero vector, that is, B− = {B ∈ B :0>∗ B}=
{B ∈ B :B(s,1)+
∑
c≥2max{0,B(s, c)}< 0 ∀ s}.
Theorem 3 then implies that X≥∗ [>∗]Y⇒X% [≻]Y.
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4. Strict vs. weak preference: an example. The closedness of the repre-
sentative sets of s.d.e.u. functions in Theorems 2 and 3 is attributable to the
use of weak preference as the behavioral primitive, together with a strong
continuity assumption. In contrast, SSK use strict preference as the behav-
ioral primitive, together with a weaker continuity assumption, to explicitly
allow for the representation of incomplete preferences by open sets that may
fail to contain probability/utility pairs.
The differences in these approaches are illustrated by an example of
SSK (Example 4.1) involving two states and three consequences, that is,
S = {1,2} and C = {0,1,2}. Consequences 0 and 1 have state-independent
utilities of 0 and 1 by assumption, so that a probability/utility pair can
be parameterized by the probability assigned to state 1 and the utility as-
signed to consequence 2. Consider two probability/utility pairs (pi, ui) in
which p0(1) = 0.1, p1(1) = 0.3, u0(2) = 0.1 and u1(2) = 0.4. Let v0 and v1
denote the corresponding s.d.e.u. functions—that is, vi(s, c) = pi(s)ui(c) for
i = 0,1. Then Uvi(X) denotes the expected utility assigned to lottery X
by (pi, ui), with Uv0(H2) = 0.1 and Uv1(H2) = 0.4. Now let ≻ be defined
as the preference relation that satisfies a weak Pareto condition with re-
spect to these two probability/utility pairs—that is, X ≻Y ⇔ {Uv0(X) >
Uv0(Y) and Uv1(X)>Uv1(Y)}. Any s.d.e.u. function that is a convex com-
bination of v0 and v1 also agrees with ≻, so the representing set V
∗∗ is the
closed line segment whose endpoints are v0 and v1, but none of its interior
points are probability/utility pairs.
Next SSK extend ≻ to obtain a new preference relation ≻′′ by impos-
ing the additional strict preferences H0.4≻
′′
H2≻
′′
H0.1. The effect of this
extension is to remove the two endpoints of the representing set of s.d.e.u.
functions, so that ≻′′ is represented by the open line segment connecting v0
with v1. SSK point out that, although ≻
′′ satisfies all their axioms, there
is no agreeing probability/utility pair for it, since the only two candidates
have been deliberately excluded. They proceed to axiomatize the concept
of “almost state-independent” utilities, which agree with a strict preference
relation and are “within ε” of being state-independent. Clearly, ≻′′ has an
almost-state-independent representation, containing points arbitrarily close
to v0 and v1.
In the present framework, where weak preference is primitive, there is no
way to implement a constraint such as H2 ≻H0.1 except by asserting that
H2 %H0.1+ε for some ε > 0. If this assertion is made, axiom A6 begins to
nibble on the v0 end of the line segment and continues nibbling until the
representation collapses to the v1 end. (See [18] for details.) If instead the
other endpoint is removed, by adding the constraint H0.4−ε %H2 for ε > 0,
collapse occurs to v0. If both constraints are added, the entire interval is
annihilated, yielding incoherence (a violation of A5). Hence, this example is
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unstable in the sense that any finite extension of the original preference rela-
tion leads to a collapse to one or the other of the original probability/utility
pairs, or else to incoherence.
5. The need for stronger state-independence. In the preceding example
a strict preference relation was represented by an open set of s.d.e.u. func-
tions whose extreme points were state-independent, and in extending that
relation by imposing ε-tighter weak preferences, it was impossible to retain
any agreeing state-dependent utilities that were not convex combinations
of agreeing state-independent utilities. A second example shows that this
is not always the case under axioms A1–A6: the representing set of state-
dependent utilities is not always a convex hull of state-independent utilities,
so that nonconstant lotteries may have lower or upper expected utilities
that are not supported by any probability/utility pairs. This is not due to
the choice of weak vs. strict preference as a primitive, but rather due to an
inherent weakness of the usual state-independence axiom in the absence of
completeness. A6 serves (only) to extend conditional preferences between
constant lotteries to other conditioning events, but, without completeness,
there may be few pairs of constant lotteries whose conditional preferences
are known, and hence, there may be limited opportunity to apply this axiom.
To illustrate this problem, let there be three states and three conse-
quences, and let X be the lottery defined by X(1,0) =X(2,2) =X(3,1) = 1.
That is, X yields consequences 0, 2 and 1 with certainty in states 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Suppose that all states are judged to have probability at least
0.1, and X is judged to have an unconditional expected utility of at least 0.5.
Furthermore, a coin flip between X and {consequence 2 if state 1, otherwise
Z} is preferred to a coin flip between utility 0.5 and {utility 0.9 if state 1,
otherwise Z}, but also a coin flip between X and {utility 0.1 if state 2, oth-
erwise Z} is preferred to a coin flip between utility 0.5 and {consequence 2
given state 2, otherwise Z}. The common alternative Z in each comparison
is arbitrary by Theorem 1. The basis for % can then be expressed as
HE %H0.1 for E=E1,E2,E3,(5.1)
X%H0.5,(5.2)
1
2E1H2 +
1
2X%
1
2E1H0.9 +
1
2H0.5,(5.3)
1
2E2H0.1 +
1
2X%
1
2E2H2 +
1
2H0.5,(5.4)
where the arbitrary common term 12(1−E1)Z has been suppressed on both
sides of (5.3), and likewise 12 (1−E2)Z has been suppressed in (5.4). Notice
that, by Theorem 1, (5.2) implies 12E1Y+
1
2X%
1
2E1Y+
1
2H0.5 for any Y,
from which (5.3) has been constructed by replacing Y with H2 on the LHS
and replacing it with H0.9 on the RHS. Similarly, (5.2) implies
1
2E2Y +
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1
2X+%
1
2E2Y+
1
2H0.5, from which (5.4) has been constructed by replacing
Y with H0.1 on the LHS and with H2 on the RHS. These two new preferences
imply that the lower bound on the expected utility of X among all probabil-
ity/utility pairs agreeing with % must be strictly greater than 0.5, which can
be seen as follows. First, an s.d.e.u. function v agrees with (5.3) if and only
if Uv(X)− Uv(H0.5)≥ Uv(E1H0.9)− Uv(E1H2), and it agrees with (5.4) if
and only if Uv(X)− Uv(H0.5) ≥ Uv(E2H2)− Uv(E2H0.1). Second, because
Uv(H0.1) < Uv(H0.9), any v must satisfy either Uv(H0.9) − Uv(H2) > 0 or
Uv(H2) − Uv(H0.1) > 0 or both, and if v is a probability/utility pair that
agrees with (5.1), it must also satisfy the corresponding conditional inequali-
ties Uv(E1H0.9)−Uv(E1H2)> 0 or Uv(E2H2)−Uv(E2H0.1)> 0 or both, be-
cause E1 and E2 have positive lower probability. Hence, a probability/utility
pair v can agree with (5.1), (5.3) and (5.4) only if Uv(X)−Uv(H0.5)> 0,
that is, Uv(X)> 0.5. In fact, by nonlinear programming, the minimum ex-
pected utility of X among all agreeing probability/utility pairs is achieved
at p(1) = 0.41, p(2) = 0.1, p(3) = 0.49, u(2) = 0.379/0.51 = 0.74314, and its
value is p(2)u(2) + p(3) = 0.564314.
However, by direct application of axiom A6 together with A1–A5, the
expected utility of X cannot be determined to be strictly greater than 0.5.
To apply A6, it is first necessary to find nonnegative linear combinations of
the differences between the LHS’s and RHS’s of (5.1)–(5.4) that are condi-
tionally constant—that is, of the form EB, where E is a not-potentially-null
event and B is constant across states. But the search for such conditionally
constant terms is constrained here by the presence of a nonconstant term
proportional to X −H0.5 in the differences between LHS’s and RHS’s of
(5.2)–(5.4), as well as by the use of two different conditioning events in (5.3)
and (5.4). Furthermore, in order for A6 to “bite,” B needs to have a negative
lower expected utility when conditioned on some other event F. The effect
of applying A6 will then be to raise this lower expected utility to zero, which
shrinks the set of s.d.e.u. functions representing %. In the example the few
conditionally-constant lottery differences EB that can be constructed from
(5.1)–(5.4) all turn out to satisfy B≥∗ 0, which is uninformative. (This can
be determined by solving a sequence of 14 linear programs.) The lower ex-
pected utility of X therefore remains at 0.5 despite the fact that this value
is not realized, or even closely approached, by any probability/utility pair
agreeing with %.
This example shows that when preferences are incomplete, axiom A6 is
insufficient to guarantee that they are represented by (the convex hull of )
a set of probability/utility pairs. Evidently, a stronger condition is needed,
such as follows:
A6* (Strong state-independence) If X and Y are constant, X′ %Y′, and
HE %Hp and HF -Hq with p > 0, then
αEX+ (1−α)X′ % αEY+ (1−α)Y′
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=⇒ βFX+ (1− β)X′ % βFY+ (1− β)Y′
for β = 1 if α= 1 and otherwise for all β such that β1−β ≤
α
1−α
p
q
.
In words, A6* requires that whenever a weak preference between two arbi-
trary lotteries X′ and Y′ is preserved under an objective mixture with two
conditional constant lotteries EX and EY, respectively, and the common
conditioning event E is not potentially null, then the same preference is pre-
served under a mixture with the same constant lotteries conditioned on any
other common event F, where the odds-ratio of the new mixture can be at
least as large as the original odds-ratio multiplied by the ratio of the lower
probability of E to the upper probability of F. In terms of a primal set B∗∗∗
of preferred directions, A6* requires that if B′ ∈ B∗∗∗ and B′ +EB ∈ B∗∗∗,
where B is constant and E is not potentially null, then B′+(p/q)FB ∈ B∗∗∗.
If % satisfies A1–A6, then it must have an extension that also satisfies
A6*, because A1–A6 require the existence of at least one agreeing prob-
ability/utility pair, and the additional preferences implied by A6* do not
eliminate any agreeing probability/utility pairs. The scale factor p/q ensures
precisely that, even in the worst case where Uv(B
′)> 0, Uv(B)< 0, pv(E) = p
and pv(F) = q, Uv(B
′)+ pv(E)Uv(B)≥ 0 =⇒Uv(B
′)+ (p/q)pv(F)Uv(B)≥ 0
for any v that is a probability/utility pair.
The stronger axiom does affect the counterexample discussed above. Let
B
′ = X −H0.5, in terms of which (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) are equivalent to
B
′ ∈ B∗∗∗, B′+E1(H2−H0.9) ∈ B
∗∗∗ and B′+E2(H0.1−H2) ∈ B
∗∗∗, respec-
tively. By linear programming, E1, E2 and E3 are found to have identical
lower probabilities of 0.1 and upper probabilities of 0.41, 0.4444 . . . and 0.8,
respectively. A6* can then be applied to add the following preferred di-
rections to B∗∗∗: B′+(0.1/0.4444 . . .)E2(H2−H0.9), B
′+(0.1/0.8)E3(H2−
H0.9), B
′+(0.1/0.41)E1(H0.1−H2) and B
′+(0.1/0.8)E3(H0.1−H2). These
vectors must have nonnegative expected utility under any agreeing s.d.e.u.
function, which immediately raises the lower expected utility of X from 0.5
to 0.54, and further iterations of A6* approach the lower limit of 0.564314
among agreeing probability/utility pairs. However, iteration of A6* via lin-
ear programming and vertex enumeration is a cumbersome way to compute
probability and utility bounds. The main theorem of this section shows that
there is a simpler way:
Theorem 4. % satisfies A1–A5 and A6* if and only if it is represented
by a nonempty set V∗∗∗ ∈ V++ of s.d.e.u. functions that is the convex hull of
a set of probability/utility pairs. In particular, if {Xn %Yn} is a basis for
%, then V∗∗∗ is the convex hull of the set of probability/utility pairs in V++
that satisfy {Uv(Xn)≥Uv(Yn)}.
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If the basis is finite, the construction of V∗∗∗ can be carried out as fol-
lows. First, form the convex polytope defined by the constraints {Uv(Xn)≥
Uv(Yn)}, v ∈ V
++. Next, take the intersection of this polytope with the
nonconvex set of all probability/utility pairs. (If the latter intersection is
empty, the preferences do not satisfy A5 given A1–A4 and A6*: they are
incoherent.) Finally, take the convex hull of what remains: this is the set
V∗∗∗.
6. Discussion. It has been shown that, in order to obtain a convenient
representation of incomplete preferences by sets of probability/utility pairs,
it does not suffice merely to delete the completeness axiom from the stan-
dard axiomatic framework of Anscombe and Aumann, due to a fundamen-
tal weakness of the traditional state-independence axiom in the absence of
completeness. The approach here has been to substitute a stronger state-
independence postulate (A6*), which still has “bite” in the absence of com-
pleteness. This approach follows a common theme in axiomatic rational
choice theory, namely, the search for a small number of independent, con-
structive norms of behavior which collectively turn out to imply the existence
of measurable beliefs and values.
Seidenfeld [26] has suggested a modified approach: instead of directly
strengthening the state-independence property, simply “compel the miss-
ing preferences” by the principle of indirect reasoning, namely, compel the
preference Y ≻X [Y %X] whenever the contrary assertion X%Y [X≻Y]
would lead to a violation of the prevailing axioms in light of preferences
already known. According to this principle, wherever a weak [strict] prefer-
ence is “precluded,” the opposite strict [weak] preference must be affirmed.
In the example of the previous section, it is not directly implied by A1–A6
that X%Hu for any u > 0.5, yet the same axioms preclude that Hu %X
for any u < 0.564314. If indirect reasoning were invoked, the preferences
X≻Hu would immediately be compelled for all u < 0.564314. By the same
token, Theorem 3 would suffice to fix the lower [upper] expected utility of
any lottery at the minimum [maximum] achieved among all agreeing prob-
ability/utility pairs, and the stronger state-independence axiom A6* would
not be needed for the tighter representation of Theorem 4. (SSK use indirect
reasoning in a more limited role to deal with closure of the sets of target
utilities in their model, a step which is avoided here through the use of weak
rather than strict preference as a primitive.)
Indirect reasoning, otherwise known as modus tollens ((p→ q) ∧ ¬q)→
¬p), is a tautological implication of two-valued propositional logic; hence,
it applies to preferences that are complete: if either X%Y or else Y ≻X
must be true, then if one is precluded, the other naturally must be affirmed.
Indirect reasoning also applies tautologically to incomplete preferences un-
der axioms A1–A5 (only), because according to Theorem 1, the preference
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X % Y merely adds the new direction X − Y to the convex cone B∗ of
preferred directions, which is to say, it interacts linearly with preferences
already known. Thus, X%Y is precluded precisely when X−Y combines
linearly with an existing element of B∗ to produce a vector in the open neg-
ative orthant, implying that Y −X+ Z ∈ B∗ for some Z ∈ B−, which does
entail Y ≻X. However, the tautology breaks down when the conventional
state-independence axiom A6 is added to the mix, because the new direc-
tion X−Y then interacts nonlinearly with an already-known direction of
preference if they can be linearly combined to yield a conditionally constant
direction that can be propagated to other conditioning events. When the
new conditional directions are also added to the cone, a vector in the open
negative orthant may result, thus precluding X%Y even if it is not already
implied that Y ≻X. Under these conditions, indirect reasoning becomes a
logically separate “axiom” of rational choice to which we may or may not
wish to subscribe.
The argument in favor of indirect reasoning is that, at the end of the day,
the decision maker in the example of Section 5 might face a choice between,
say, X and H0.54. If the preference H0.54 %X is precluded, it would appear
as though the choice of H0.54 over X should also be precluded, in which
case the implication X≻H0.54 would appear to be inescapable as a require-
ment of rational choice. However, the counterargument is that the point of
dropping the completeness assumption is precisely to permit the decision
maker to judge some alternatives to be noncomparable, which weakens the
link between preference and choice to a one-way implication: a preferred al-
ternative should be chosen where it exists, but a chosen alternative need not
be preferred if the alternatives are regarded as noncomparable. In the exam-
ple, X and H0.54 are noncomparable under axioms A1–A6 given (only) the
preferences (5.1)–(5.4), hence, either may be chosen on that basis, and the
choice of H0.54 over X is in fact supported by some agreeing state-dependent
utilities that are not ruled out by A6 because of the relatively weak con-
straints it imposes on the shape of the agreeing set V∗∗. (What is actually
precluded is not the preference of H0.54 over X per se, but rather the addi-
tional conditional preferences that would be implied by declaring H0.54%X
in the presence of A6.) Still, even if indirect reasoning is not an inescapable
requirement of rational choice, it can be defended as an axiom that might be
useful to enforce when preferences are incomplete, as it is used elsewhere in
the foundations of mathematics (e.g., in geometry). However, in this regard,
it does not have the elementary character of the other axioms and cannot be
tested independently of them, so it is still of interest to ask whether there is
some other “direct” postulate that will reduce indirect reasoning once again
to a tautology, and that is precisely what A6* accomplishes here.
This paper has considered the case of finite sets of states and conse-
quences. SSK consider the somewhat more general case of a countable set
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of consequences and a finite partition of a possibly-infinite underlying state
space. However, it is often desirable to consider even more abstract settings
involving uncountable sets. The case in which the state space is a compact
subset of ℜn and the consequence space is a compact subset of ℜ or ℜm is of
particular importance (e.g., in financial economics), where a lottery would
naturally be defined by a probability density or cumulative mass at a given
consequence in a given state. The axioms of this paper are applicable to such
objects, and Theorems 1 and 2 can still be obtained by appropriately gen-
eralized separating hyperplane theorems: the primal representation of % is
again a convex cone whose directions are differences between more-preferred
and less-preferred lotteries, and the dual representation is a convex set of
agreeing s.d.e.u. functions; indeed, just such a representation is given by Gar-
cia Del Amo and Rı´os Insua [6]. The further restriction to state-independent
representations consisting of sets of probability/utility pairs is more prob-
lematic but very much of interest in order to reduce the dimensionality of
the parameter space in Bayesian robustness applications. Under suitable
regularity (e.g., smoothness) conditions, it might be conjectured that a rep-
resentation of incomplete preferences by sets of state-independent or almost
state-independent utilities could still be obtained, since any discretization
of the state space and consequence space would have to satisfy Theorems 3
and 4 of this paper. The issue of “missing preferences” would presumably
still arise, requiring either an axiom such as A6* of this paper or else the
indirect reasoning principle. An analogous set of results in Savage’s frame-
work (which requires an infinite state space but does not involve objective
probabilities) would appear to be more difficult to obtain, since it does not
lend itself to the same techniques of convex analysis that are made possible
by objective mixtures, although his state-independence axiom is essentially
the same as that of Anscombe–Aumann and might be expected to suffer a
similar loss of traction in the absence of completeness.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that X−Y ∝X′−Y′, that is, α(X−
Y) = (1− α)(X′ −Y′) for some α ∈ (0,1), where X,Y,X′,Y′ are lotteries.
Then, by the mixture-independence axiom, X % Y ⇔ αX + (1 − α)X′ %
αY + (1− α)X′ = αX+ (1− α)Y′⇔X′ %Y′, establishing that there is a
collection of vectors B∗ such that B ∈ B∗⇒ αB ∈ B∗ ∀α> 0 and X%Y⇔
X−Y ∈ B∗. Mixture-independence and transitivity together imply that if
X%Y and X′ %Y′, then αX+ (1− α)X′ % αY + (1− α)Y′, establishing
that B∗ is convex. The best/worst axiom establishes that B∗ is nonempty
(in particular, it includes Hc −H0 and H1 −Hc for c > 1), but coherence
requires that it not be the whole space (in particular, it excludes H0−H1),
and the continuity axiom implies that it is closed. 
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Proof of Theorem 2. Every convex cone B∗ ⊂ B is associated with
a dual cone V∗ ⊂ B such that B ∈ B∗ if and only if Uv(B) ≡ v
T
B ≥ 0 for
all v ∈ V∗, and coherence requires that Uv(H1 −H0) > 0 for all v ∈ V
∗.
Since the elements of B∗ are differences between pairs of lotteries, their
components sum to zero within states. Hence, Uv(B) ≥ 0⇔ Uv′(B) ≥ 0,
where v′(s, c) = αv(s, c) + β(s) for α> 0 and arbitrary {β(s)}, so w.l.o.g. it
can be assumed that v ∈ V+. 
Proof of Theorem 3. It suffices to show that a preference relation
satisfying A1–A6 can be extended to assign a unique state-independent util-
ity to any consequence c > 1. This extension can then be performed for
c = 2,3, . . . ,K, in turn, to obtain a unique state-independent utility func-
tion, for which every agreeing s.d.e.u. function is a probability/utility pair.
Therefore, consider some consequence c > 1, and let u(c) denote the max-
imum value of u such that Hc %Hu—that is, the greatest lower utility for
consequence c. (The maximum exists by virtue of continuity.) Since A1–A5
apply, there exists a cone of preferred directions representing %. When A6
also applies, let this cone be denoted by B∗∗: in this case it contains all vec-
tors of the form Es(Hc −Hu(c)). Then % can be coherently extended so as
to assign c an upper utility also equal to u(c). To show this, let B∗∗c denote
the convex hull of B∗∗ and the rays whose directions are Es(Hu(c)−Hc) for
all states s, noting that these vectors are opposite in sign to those already
known (by A6) to belong to B∗∗. Since B∗∗c is also a convex cone, it repre-
sents a relation satisfying A1–A4; and since it is formed by adding to B∗∗
a difference between two constant lotteries and all the conditionalizations
thereof, the relation it represents also satisfies A6. If B∗∗c is also disjoint from
the negative orthant B−, then the relation it represents is coherent and is
the desired extension %c. It remains to be shown, then, that B
∗∗
c is disjoint
from B−. Suppose that this is not true. Then there must exist B ∈ B∗∗ and
{β(s)} ∈ [0,1] such that[
−B−
(∑
s∈S
β(s)Es(Hu(c) −Hc)
)]
min
> 0
⇐⇒
[
−B−
(∑
s∈S
(1− β(s))Es(Hc −Hu(c))
)
− (Hu(c) −Hc)
]
min
> 0
⇐⇒ [−B′ − (Hu(c)−Hc)]min > 0,
where
B
′ ≡B+
∑
s∈S
(1− β(s))Es(Hc −Hu(c)).
Note that B′ ∈ B∗∗, because B∗∗ includes all vectors of the form E(Hc −
Hu(c)) and their nonnegative linear combinations. Rearrangement of the last
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inequality yields (Hc−Hu(c))>B
′, which is equivalent to (Hc−Hu(c)+ε)≥
B
′ for some ε > 0. Because Hc−Hu(c)+ε stochastically dominates B
′ ∈ B∗∗,
it follows that Hc −Hu(c)+ε ∈ B
∗∗, whence also Hc %Hu(c)+ε. Thus, u(c) +
ε is a lower utility for c, contradicting the assumption that u(c) was the
greatest lower utility for c under the relation %, therefore B∗∗c must be
disjoint from B−. Finally, the same method of extension, namely, adding
a preference which asserts that the greatest lower utility is also an upper
utility, can be applied to an arbitrary constant lottery X prior to {Hc} to
show that the maximum or minimum expected utility of a constant lottery
must be achieved by an agreeing probability/utility pair. 
Proof of Theorem 4. The earlier results (based on A1–A6 only) es-
tablish that % is represented by a convex cone of preferred directions and
dually by a convex set of s.d.e.u. functions containing at least one probabil-
ity/utility pair. When the stronger A6* holds, let these sets be denoted by
B∗∗∗ and V∗∗∗, respectively. It must be shown that V∗∗∗ is the convex hull of
a set of probability/utility pairs, which means that, for any lotteries X,Y,
the minimum of Uv(X)−Uv(Y) over all v ∈ V
∗∗∗ is achieved at some v which
is a probability/utility pair. Suppose that d =minv∈V∗∗∗(Uv(X)− Uv(Y)).
Since Uv(H0) = 0 and Uv(Hu) = u, it follows that d is the maximum value
of u for which
Uv(
1
2X+
1
2H0)≥ Uv(
1
2Y+
1
2Hu)(7.1)
for all v ∈ V∗∗∗, or, equivalently, the maximum value of u for which 12X+
1
2H0 %
1
2Y +
1
2Hu, or, equivalently, the maximum value of u for which
X+H0 −Y −Hu ∈ B
∗∗∗. To prove that there is a probability/utility pair
for which (7.1) holds with equality, it will suffice to show that % has an ex-
tension satisfying A1–A6, denoted %d, in which the reverse preference also
holds, namely, 12Y +
1
2Hd %d
1
2X+
1
2H0. [It is not necessary to enforce the
stronger axiom A6* on %d, because if (7.1) holds with equality for all v
agreeing with %d, A6 guarantees via Theorem 3 that at least one must be a
probability/utility pair.] The primal representation of %d is constructed as
follows. First, define Bd = X+H0 −Y −Hd, noting that it is an extreme
direction of B∗∗∗. Then include the reverse preference by adding to the con-
vex cone B∗∗∗ the ray whose direction is −Bd. Then apply A1–A3, which
convexifies the set, yielding an expanded cone. (A4 and A5 are automatically
satisfied thus far.) Finally, apply A6 (the special case of A6* with α = 1),
which means to (i) determine which new conditional directions of the form
FiBi, where Fi is a not-potentially-null event and Bi is constant, are in the
expanded cone; (ii) then propagate the same conditional preferences to all
possible conditioning events by adding the directions {EsBi} for all s and
i; and (iii) take the convex hull again. Thus, the primal cone consists of all
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vectors of the form B0 − γdBd +
∑
s,i γsiEsBi, where B0 ∈ B
∗∗∗, γd ≥ 0 and
γsi ≥ 0. Suppose that one such vector is in the open negative orthant B
−,
in violation of A5, that is, suppose that B0 − γdBd +
∑
s,i γsiEsBi = Z, or,
equivalently,
B0 +
∑
s,i
γsiEsBi = γdBd +Z,(7.2)
where B0 ∈ B
∗∗∗ and Z ∈ B−. It will be shown that this leads to a contra-
diction.
Because the conditional direction FiBi is in the convex hull of B
∗∗∗ plus
the additional direction −Bd, but not in B
∗∗∗ alone, it satisfies Bd+FiBi ∈
B∗∗∗. Because Bd ∈ B
∗∗∗ and each Fi is not-potentially-null and the origi-
nal relation % satisfies A6*, there exist positive constants {δsi} such that
Bd + δsiEsBi ∈ B
∗∗∗ for all i and s. Multiplying through by γsi/δsi,
summing and invoking the convexity of B∗∗∗ yields (
∑
s,i γsi/δsi)Bd
+
∑
s,i γsiEsBi ∈ B
∗∗∗, whence also B0 + (
∑
s,i γsi/δsi)Bd +
∑
s,i γsiEsBi ∈
B∗∗∗. Adding (
∑
s,i γsi/δsi)Bd to both sides of (7.2) and comparing, it follows
that (γd+
∑
s,i γsi/δsi)Bd+Z∈ B
∗∗∗.Multiplication by k = (γd+
∑
s,i γsi/δsi)
−1
yields Bd + kZ ∈ B
∗∗∗, where kZ ∈ B−, contradicting the assumption that
Bd was an extreme direction of B
∗∗∗ and constructively proving the existence
of u > d for which 12X+
1
2H0 %
1
2Y+
1
2Hu. 
Acknowledgments. The author is grateful to David Rı´os Insua, Teddy
Seidenfeld, James E. Smith, Peter Wakker and two anonymous referees for
comments on earlier drafts.
REFERENCES
[1] Anscombe, F. and Aumann, R. (1963). A definition of subjective probability. Ann.
Math. Statist. 34 199–205. MR0145561
[2] Aumann, R. (1962). Utility theory without the completeness axiom. Econometrica
30 445–462.
[3] Dre`ze, J. (1987). Decision theory with moral hazard and state-dependent prefer-
ences. In Essays on Economic Decisions Under Uncertainty (J. Dre`ze, ed.).
Cambridge Univ. Press.
[4] Dubra, J., Maccheroni, F. and Ok, E. (2004). Expected utility theory without
the completeness axiom. J. Econom. Theory 115 118–133. MR2036107
[5] Fishburn, P. C. (1982). The Foundations of Expected Utility. Reidel, Dordrecht.
MR0723663
[6] Garcia Del Amo, A. and Rı´os Insua, D. (2002). A note on an open problem in
the foundations of statistics. RACSAM Rev. R. Acad. Cienc. Exactas F´ıs. Nat.
Ser. A Mat. 96 55–61. MR1915671
[7] Giro´n, F. J. and Rı´os, S. (1980). Quasi-Bayesian behavior: A more realistic ap-
proach to decision making? In Bayesian Statistics (J. M. Bernardo, M. H. De-
Groot, D. V. Lindley and A. F. M. Smith, eds.) 17–38. Univ. Press, Valencia.
MR0638872
20 R. NAU
[8] Kadane, J. B. and Winkler, R. L. (1988). Separating probability elicitation from
utilities. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 83 357–363. MR0971360
[9] Karni, E. (1985). Decision Making Under Uncertainty : The Case of State-Dependent
Preferences. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
[10] Karni, E. (1993). A definition of subjective probabilities with state-dependent pref-
erences. Econometrica 61 187–198. MR1201708
[11] Karni, E. and Mongin, P. (2000). On the determination of subjective probability
by choices. Management Sci. 46 233–248.
[12] Karni, E., Schmeidler, D. and Vind, K. (1983). On state-dependent preferences
and subjective probabilities. Econometrica 51 1021–1031. MR0710219
[13] Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical
Survey. Wiley, New York. MR0087572
[14] Moskowitz, H., Preckel, P. V. and Yang, A. (1993). Decision analysis with
incomplete utility and probability information. Oper. Res. 41 864–879.
[15] Nau, R. (1992). Indeterminate probabilities on finite sets. Ann. Statist. 20 1737–
1767. MR1193311
[16] Nau, R. (1995). Coherent decision analysis with inseparable probabilities and utili-
ties. J. Risk and Uncertainty 10 71–91.
[17] Nau, R. (2001). de Finetti was right: Probability does not exist. Theory and Decision
51 89–124. MR1944461
[18] Nau, R. (2003). The shape of incomplete preferences. In Proc. Third International
Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications (J.-M. Bernardo,
T. Seidenfeld and M. Zaffalon, eds.) 406–420. Carleton Scientific, Waterloo, ON.
[19] Rigotti, R. and Shannon, C. (2005). Uncertainty and risk in financial markets.
Econometrica 73 203–243. MR2115635
[20] Rı´os Insua, D. (1990). Sensitivity Analysis in Multiobjective Decision Making.
Springer, New York. MR1116995
[21] Rı´os Insua, D. (1992). On the foundations of decision making under partial infor-
mation. Theory and Decision 33 83–100. MR1170561
[22] Rı´os Insua, D. and Ruggeri, F., eds. (2000). Robust Bayesian Analysis. Lecture
Notes in Statist. 152. Springer, New York. MR1795206
[23] Rubin, H. (1987). A weak system of axioms for “rational” behavior and the nonsep-
arability of utility from prior. Statist. Decisions 5 47–58. MR0886877
[24] Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York. MR0063582
[25] Schervish, M. J., Seidenfeld, T. E. and Kadane, J. B. (1990). State-dependent
utilities. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 85 840–847. MR1138364
[26] Seidenfeld, T. (1994). Personal communication, June 1.
[27] Seidenfeld, T., Schervish, M. J. and Kadane, J. B. (1990). Decisions without
ordering. In Acting and Reflecting (W. Sieg, ed.) 143–170. Reidel, Dordrecht.
[28] Seidenfeld, T. E., Schervish, M. J. and Kadane, J. B. (1995). A representation
of partially ordered preferences. Ann. Statist. 23 2168–2217. MR1389871
[29] Smith, C. A. B. (1961). Consistency in statistical inference and decision (with dis-
cussion). J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 23 1–37. MR0124097
[30] Staum, J. (2003). Pricing and hedging in incomplete markets: Fundamental theo-
rems and robust utility maximization. Technical Report 1351, Cornell ORIE.
Available at users.iems.northwestern.edu/˜staum/TR1351.pdf.
[31] Suppes, P. (1974). The measurement of belief. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 36 160–
175. MR0385943
[32] Walley, P. (1991). Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. Chapman and
Hall, London. MR1145491
SHAPE OF INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES 21
[33] Williams, P. M. (1976). Indeterminate probabilities.
In Formal Methods in the Methodology of Empirical Sciences (M. Prze le¸cki, K.
Szaniawski, R. Wo´jcicki and G. Malinowski, eds.) 229–246. Reidel, Dordecht.
MR0535905
The Fuqua School of Business
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina 27708-0120
USA
E-mail: robert.nau@duke.edu
URL: www.duke.edu/˜rnau
